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Socio-economic and political developments in sub-Saharan Africa remain a 
mixed bag. While crises and structural problems occupy our attention, other 
developments justify a more optimistic outlook: relations between coun-
tries on the continent as well as with Europe and other world regions show 
signs of hope and improvement. We present a selective list and analysis of 
“ten things to watch” in Africa in 2020.
 • Elections and democratisation: The year ahead will be one of high-risk elec-
tions in many African countries, of which five arguably stand out: Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Guinea. “Explosive” elections are often 
connected to contested term limits for presidents.
 • Peace and security: As in previous years, challenges emerge from ever-present 
power struggles as well as from contested elections, weak states, conflicts be-
tween identity groups, and – particularly in West and East Africa – jihadism. 
The latter poses the biggest challenge in the Sahel, where international support 
has simultaneously become both more important and more difficult.
 • Socio-economic development: While many structural problems persist, there 
are signs for winds of change. Regional economic integration projects such as 
the African Continental Free Trade Area and the common currency, eco, in 
West Africa advance, and legal obstacles to more equal gender relations are in-
creasingly being called into question. In times of global confrontations between 
the United States, China, and other countries, “trade wars” provide threats but 
also opportunities for Africa.
Policy Implications
As a member of the United Nations Security Council and assuming the EU presi-
dency, Germany’s involvement in African affairs will be greater than usual in 
2020. African and external actors, such as the European Union, should act early 
to mitigate conflict risks, especially with regard to high-stakes elections in sever-
al countries and to contain the spread of jihadist violence. Reform efforts require 
strong but prudent international support, so they can survive domestic political 
pushback. 
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Explosive Elections and Contested Term Limits 
In 2020, nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa will hold presidential elections: 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
Guinea, the Seychelles, Tanzania, and Togo. In addition there will be parliamentary 
elections in Ethiopia, a parliamentary system in which the prime minister is head 
of the executive. All nine presidential countries have in common that their constitu-
tions prescribe a presidential term limit. Most African countries introduced such 
term limits in the early 1990s as a check to presidential power, but since the later 
years of that decade incumbents have frequently contested them. 
In five of the upcoming elections, the term limits do not pose a threat to the 
incumbents because they will be vying for their first re-election. In Burkina Faso, 
for instance, Roch Marc Kaboré is facing his first re-election attempt (like his fellow 
presidents in the CAR, Ghana, the Seychelles, and Tanzania). However, in the four 
other cases the incumbents have served at least two terms in presidential office and 
in all of these countries the constitutional term limit was under intense debate in 
recent months. In Togo, Faure Gnassingbé will run for his fourth term despite the 
re-introduction of a two-term limit in the 2019 constitutional amendment in re-
sponse to strong popular protest. The constitution’s transitional provision clarified 
that Gnassingbé’s first three terms do not count under the 2019 clause. In Burundi, 
many observers expect Pierre Nkurunziza to bid for a fourth term – even after his 
third one was already constitutionally and violently contested (more below). In 
Côte d’Ivoire, Alassane ouattara is approaching the end of his second term and has 
issued contradictory statements about whether he will run again for presidential of-
fice (more below). Guinea’s Alpha Condé has openly shown his ambitions for a third 
term, aiming at a constitutional referendum. 
In all of these cases, it seems to be the president and his political allies rather 
than the constitutional rules that decide whether it is time to step down or not. 
However, this year’s sample of term-limit contests does not tell the whole story. 
In countries like Cabo Verde, Ghana, or Tanzania, politicians have constantly re-
spected the term limit and at least two incumbents have obeyed and left power in 
due course since 1990. 
The 2020 Presidential Elections in Guinea: An Ethnic Powder Keg?
In Guinea, 81-year-old president Condé has refused to rule out his candidacy in 
the 2020 presidential elections, despite a constitutional term limit to that effect. In 
September 2019, he asked his government to look into drafting a new constitution 
(Africanews 2019). Legislative elections, originally scheduled for january 2019, 
have been postponed at least until February 2020. The 2020 elections will take 
place in a deeply divided country. Guinea’s political forces represent the country’s 
two dominant ethnic communities. Condé is Malinké (Mandinka) and opposition 
leader Cellou Dalein Diallo is Peulh (Fulani). 
In Guinea, the widespread public belief holds that whoever wins will use – and, 
if necessary, abuse – the powers of the presidency for near-absolute control over the 
political system, to create advantages for their own ethnic group. Thus the stakes 
are high, especially for the Peulh – who have never held the presidency. Militants 
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from both political camps are willing to take protests to the streets, as bloody clash-
es during the 2010 and 2015 elections have shown. Condé’s government has re-
sponded to protests with increasing repression and the intimidation of journalists. 
According to Amnesty International (2019), at least 70 protesters and bystanders 
have been killed since 2015 while 109 citizens have died in custody. In 2020, politi-
cal polarisation will be higher than ever. Condé still wants to hold a constitutional 
referendum even in spite of mass demonstrations against his grip on power in the 
last few months.
The 2020 Elections in Ethiopia: Political Reforms under Severe 
Stress
In December 2019, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize for breaking the stalemate with Eritrea and advancing political reforms 
in his country, including the liberalisation of the political space and the improve-
ment of human rights. Following his election as prime minister in April 2018, Abiy 
loosened the iron grip of his predecessors on the press, the political opposition, and 
on civil society. His aim is to allow peaceful competition between parties in the up-
coming national elections, which are scheduled for May 2020. He is also planning 
to restructure the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
ruling coalition, which has governed the country since 1991 and currently holds 
all 100 per cent of the parliamentary seats. Abiy’s objective is to merge the ethnic-
based coalition EPRDF into the Ethiopian Prosperity Party in the face of resistance 
from its founder, the once-dominant Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). 
Ethnicity has always been a political factor in Ethiopian politics, but since Abiy 
initiated his reforms, ethnic strife and conflicts have increased in different corners 
of the country – causing the displacement of about three million people. Re-estab-
lishing the state’s monopoly on power without regressing into repressive policies is 
one of the main challenges the prime minister now faces. Otherwise, free and fair 
elections will not be possible. One additional threat comes from his former support-
er Jawar Mohammed, a powerful social media mogul and diaspora returnee who is 
currently mobilising young ethnic Oromo against Abiy and who has incited street 
violence. Abiy is himself an Oromo, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia – but one 
which has been excluded from political participation over the centuries. However 
it seems that Oromos are currently split, and many seem to be disappointed that 
the prime minister acts as a defender of the Ethiopian nation and not as an Oromo 
activist. Another challenge consists in the sheer number of opposition groups, cur-
rently about 170, many of whom are unhappy with a new election law and doubt 
that the upcoming elections will be free and fair. Given the high levels of communal 
violence, the elections will possibly have to be postponed. In the best case, the elec-
tions will mark the beginning of multiparty democracy. In the worst one, they will 
further increase ethnic violence – which will challenge the prime minister’s ideol-
ogy of togetherness, if not the national cohesion of Ethiopia itself.
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The 2020 Elections in Burundi: A Risk for the Entire Sub-Region? 
The report by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Burundi states that 
“the 2020 elections pose a major risk [to the country]” (2019: 18). According to the 
report, common risk factors for atrocities – including severe political and economic 
instability, the weakness of state structures, the political activism of potential per-
petrators of violence, as well as the lack of a viable presence of civil society or inter-
national actors – can all be observed in the country. This is not only alarming for 
the 11 million Burundians, but also for the already-fragile Great Lakes region as a 
whole. 
The controversial 2015 elections in Burundi highlighted the repercussions of 
domestic political turmoil for its neighbouring countries in pointed terms. Follow-
ing a third-term bid and a failed coup to prevent his renewed candidacy, president 
Nkurunziza was re-elected amid violent unrest. More than 400,000 people fled 
to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Tanzania, and Rwanda. The camps 
in the first two countries are among the least funded worldwide (UNHCR 2020), 
constituting a significant challenge for the hosts. Burundian rebel groups, which 
emerged after the failed coup d’état, are operating out of the DRC. This has repeat-
edly led to deadly border clashes with Burundian forces. Moreover, severe tensions 
arose between Burundi and Rwanda in the aftermath of the elections over alleged 
interferences in domestic politics on both sides. In such a precarious regional con-
stellation, electoral turmoil in Burundi would have implications beyond this small 
African country itself. 
Nkurunziza has not yet declared his candidature for the next elections, which 
are scheduled for 20 May 2020. However, most observers expect him to run again 
as no successor has been designated thus far. This uncertainty surrounding Nku-
runziza’s candidacy has exacerbated grievances within the ruling Conseil National 
Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-
FDD). The opposition registered under a new name, Congrès National pour la 
Liberté (CNL), in early 2019, but violent crackdowns on party meetings and the 
arbitrary arrests of its members continue regardless. During the 2018 referendum, 
which sanctioned the president staying in power until 2034, the exiled opposition 
platform declared its intention to replace Nkurunziza by any available means. It 
remains hard to predict how the domestic opposition, aggrieved by constant repres-
sion, would react to a politicised poll this year. Regional mediation attempts by the 
East African Community have failed, and the regime has already declared that it 
will not allow Western observers to oversee this year’s elections. Taken  together, 
the outlook is dismal, as a free and fair poll seems highly unlikely under these cir-
cumstances. International actors need to prepare for the possibility of electoral vio-
lence, and for conflict in the aftermath. Their focus should be on supporting the 
remaining civil society and democratic opposition actors in the country, and on 
providing humanitarian assistance – while also keeping up pressure on the regime.
Haunted by the Past: Côte d’Ivoire’s 2020 Presidential Election
The stakes are high for Côte d’Ivoire’s presidential election in october 2020. The 
country is not only an anchor of stability bordering the fragile Sahel region, but has 
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also re-emerged in the past decade as francophone West Africa’s economic power-
house and an increasingly attractive investment destination. With the incumbent 
ouattara due to step down after the constitutionally mandated two terms in office, 
many fear for the relative stability of the past few years. Having previously declared 
that it was time to hand over the reins to the next generation, 77-year-old ouattara 
recently announced, however, that he would stand again if others from his gen-
eration did the same. The role of his predecessor and long-term adversary Laurent 
Gbagbo, aged 74, is one of the great unknowns. After having lost the presidential 
election to ouattara in 2010, Gbagbo was charged before the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in The Hague with crimes against humanity during the ensuing period 
of post-election violence. Following his acquittal in January 2019, he is currently in 
Belgium awaiting the decision on an appeal against the ruling – and would probably 
stand for president again, if able to return to Côte d’Ivoire. Voters may thus be faced 
with the same choice as they were in 2010, which led to months of violent confron-
tation between supporters of Gbagbo and Ouattara. 
Despite stating that it was time to relinquish power, ouattara seems intent 
on controlling the electoral process. In order to reduce the number of candidates, 
he has proposed the introduction of a sponsorship system and a deposit of CFA 
franc 200 million (approximately EUR 300,000). Claiming that a 2016 constitution 
change would allow him to stand again, the incumbent has opposed the introduc-
tion of an age limit that would bar all members of his generation from standing. 
As for the younger generation, former rebel leader turned prime minister turned 
popular presidential candidate Guillaume Soro would have his own ambitions de-
railed in late 2019. A timely arrest warrant was issued upon his scheduled return to 
Côte d’Ivoire on charges of destabilisation and embezzlement of public funds, thus 
preventing him from entering the country.
Divisions within the population run partly along the ethnic and cultural North–
South divide, but also concern the country’s relationship with France. Anti-French 
sentiments run deep after decades of economic domination and repeated military 
interventions by the former colonial power. Ouattara, who was able to assume his 
presidency after French forces had helped capture Gbagbo, has pursued an agenda 
of economic liberalism and maintains a close relationship with the European coun-
try. During a state visit to Abidjan in December 2019, President Emmanuel Macron 
briefly pointed to the importance of respecting term limits – but also allowed ouatt-
ara to shine while announcing the end of the unpopular CFA franc (see the section 
on West Africa’s new currency). It is this close relationship that has fuelled fears of 
a backlash against French citizens and businesses, as well as their Ivoirian allies. 
ouattara’s next steps will determine the intensity of the confrontation. 
Elections in Burkina Faso: Between Hope and Trepidation
Burkina Faso originally took a highly promising turn towards multiparty democracy 
following the 2014 revolution that ousted authoritarian ruler Blaise Compaoré from 
power. Former opposition politician Kaboré was elected president in free and fair 
elections in 2015. A constitutional reform process was proposed that would move the 
country from a presidential to a semi-parliamentarian system, strengthening civil 
liberties and guarding against future abuses of power. However, the pro-democracy 
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advances have since come under threat. The power vacuum of 2015 enabled jihad-
ists to infiltrate the country and destabilise the state through vicious attacks and 
mass intimidation. By 2019, the country was engulfed in an armed conflict with 
extremist groups and state institutions have ceased to function in some provinces. 
Holding a constitutional referendum has proven logistically impossible. With many 
parts of the country plunged into chaos, Kaboré has come under pressure both from 
within and without. Will the 2020 elections favour Kaboré’s MPP party? Will they 
bring a resurgence of the authoritarian forces loyal to ex-ruler Compaoré? or will 
they strengthen democratic opposition parties, such as the Union pour la Consti-
tution (UPC)? In the absence of reliable opinion polls, the outcome is difficult to 
predict. 
More important than the election outcome, however, is the electoral process 
itself. With presidential elections, legislative elections, and a constitutional referen-
dum coming up, nothing less than the legitimacy of the state is at stake. Extremists 
will try to sabotage the elections and create conflict where they can. The govern-
ment’s security forces have responded unwisely, doing damage through using ex-
cessive violence against civilians and terrorism suspects – including summary exe-
cu tions (Human Rights Watch 2019). Intercommunal conflicts, which for decades 
have been resolved peacefully, are erupting into interethnic violence. Communities 
have armed themselves by founding self-defence militias. While the government 
is rhetorically committed to rebuilding social cohesion, a viable political strategy 
and concrete action are lacking. In a situation like this, failed elections would bring 
state and society to the verge of collapse. yet, Burkina Faso has a history of beat-
ing the odds. The electoral commission has displayed exemplary independence and 
professionalism; the 2015 elections were fair and credible. If political parties can 
continue their commitment to cooperation and consensus around the elections, the 
election year 2020 could become a turning point and bring Burkina Faso closer to 
overcoming the crisis. 
Jihadism: The Most Virulent Threat to Peace and Security
Explosive elections are often closely related to other underlying conflicts. Côte 
d’Ivoire is still recovering from an armed conflict that continues to overshadow its 
political development. Reformers such as Ethiopia’s Abiy face stiff resistance inside 
and outside elections, as members of his own ethnic group are mounting increas-
ingly aggressive protests against him. Uncertainty on the succession of long-stand-
ing presidents form an additional conflict risk. A case in point is Cameroon with 
President Paul Biya, where the conflict over the secession attempt of the Southern 
Cameroons/Ambazonia has lingered on. Being in his mid-eighties, Biya lacks an 
apparent heir; regional and international actors should work on resolving the crisis 
now. In addition to the ever-present personal power struggles, dissatisfaction with 
governments over lacking public goods and corruption, demographic changes, and 
conflicts between ethnic and religious groups contribute to the latent conflict poten-
tial in many African countries. 
Jihadist violence has emerged as one of the biggest threats to security in mul-
tiple parts of Africa. Recent escalations in Somalia, Burkina Faso, and Mali are a 
reminder of the virulence of the problem. Three hotspots of jihadism persist, and 
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have strong potential for spillover: Somalia in the Horn of Africa, Nigeria in West 
and Central Africa, as well as the Western Sahel, with, as noted, strong escalation 
in Burkina Faso and central Mali over the past year. Largely unknown to the in-
ternational public, Mozambique has been also increasingly affected by a jihadist 
uprising, while in the eastern DRC the ADF rebel group recently pledged allegiance 
to Islamic State. 
Governments have little alternative to robustly engage jihadists, but initiatives 
to win the hearts and minds of potential supporters and the general public as a whole 
are even more imperative. Radical ideologies become relatively attractive where 
governments fail to deliver on security, legitimacy, and welfare. Instability and 
 other international influences from North Africa and the Middle East, especially the 
Gulf States, should be closely watched and countered, if necessary. Although peace 
and security will not be brought to Africa primarily from outside – only African 
solutions will be sustainable in the long run –, external support remains necessary. 
Western and other governments have pledged to work on, for example, fragility in 
the Sahel, although not least because they want to limit mass migration. Escala-
tion in Burkina Faso and other Sahelian countries teaches us that, in the short run, 
African security forces require support from outside. An effective Africa policy will 
require taking responsibility, not just paying lip service to principles of peace and 
security while letting others do the (dangerous) dirty work. At the same time, exer-
cising caution regarding military action is certainly wise. Service members should 
not be put at risk without good reason. Military intervention can backfire, and the 
full consequences can rarely be anticipated. France’s Sahelian engagement – once 
enthusiastically greeted by Malians – has become increasingly unpopular in the 
country for example. 
Trade Wars and Africa: Weakness Turned into Opportunity
The trade wars between the United States and the rest of world, most notably China, 
have negative effects on trade flows between and economic growth within the quar-
relling countries. Africa will only be indirectly affected, mainly through decreased 
demand for raw materials in an economic downturn (partly) resulting from these 
trade wars. The International Monetary Fund (2019) therefore estimates that re-
source-intensive countries will grow at only 2.5 per cent compared to 6 per cent for 
non-resource-intensive ones. The negative impacts will thus be most severe in those 
countries most reliant on raw materials, and on US or Chinese markets. Sudan, ex-
porting its oil almost exclusively to China, is a case in point.
Some developing countries, including those in Asia and Latin America, may 
have benefitted from the current trade war due to trade-diversion effects, for ex-
ample by substituting for Chinese exports to the US. However few, if any, African 
countries are among such “winners.” This is because few produce the affected goods 
for world markets, and because of the generally low integration of African coun-
tries into global production networks. In the current situation, non-participation 
in global value chains also shields sub-Saharan Africa, however, from potential 
disruptions due to trade and investment policies elsewhere. The crisis of the mul-
tilateral trade and investment regime should not provide the pretext for an inward-
looking economic strategy, as openness to investment and trade is likely to be an 
   8    GIGA FoCUS | AFRICA | No. 1 | jANUARy 2020 
important condition for substantially accelerated economic progress in the many 
small and capital-scarce African economies. African governments have already put 
more emphasis on regional economic integration. The most prominent examples 
are the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which entered into force in 
2019 and will (partially) take effect as a trade regime in 2020, or the West African 
common currency project outlined earlier. As these recent examples show, progress 
in regional economic integration efforts can be speedy and substantial; it may well 
be that the vagaries of the world economy under Donald Trump’s presidency pro-
vide additional impetus too.
Implementing the Eco: West Africa’s Common Currency Project
In july 2019, the heads of state of the 15 members of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECoWAS) agreed to introduce a common currency, the eco, 
in 2020. Their ambitious implementation schedule stands in stark contrast to the 
challenges presented by the region’s heterogeneity, chiefly between former French 
colonies on the one hand and former British ones on the other. Eight mostly franco-
phone members of the regional bloc form the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU/UEMoA) and already share a common currency, the CFA franc, 
which is pegged to the euro and guaranteed by France. Lauded for promoting eco-
nomic stability by its proponents, this monetary regime stemming from the colonial 
era is seen by many as a symbol of France’s continued economic dominance in the 
region and has prompted fierce criticism and protest for decades now. The end of 
the CFA franc was declared in December 2019, when Ivoirian president ouattara 
announced an agreement with his French counterpart that the currency would be 
renamed the eco in 2020. It will also be reformed, reducing France’s role therein. 
However the eco will still be pegged to the euro, and France will still guarantee the 
currency in case of government default. 
The new arrangement for the WAEMU countries is envisaged as a stepping 
stone on the way to a regional currency that includes all 15 ECoWAS members, 
which is still far from implementation. The non-WAEMU group includes coun-
tries as diverse as the economic giant Nigeria, accounting for the lion’s share of 
the  ECoWAS region’s gross domestic product, and the small island state of Cabo 
Verde; all of those concerned currently still have their own individual currencies. 
Six convergence criteria for the common currency – including an inflation rate of 
5 per cent or less, as well as limits on budget deficits and public debt – have been 
agreed on. Especially the non-WAEMU countries with flexible exchange rates are 
currently far from meeting these targets, with inflation rates in 2018 ranging from 
1 per cent or less in WAEMU countries, to 10–12 per cent in Ghana and Nigeria, to 
a staggering 23 per cent in Liberia. These difficulties illustrate the deeper underly-
ing issues: In order for a common currency to be a success, significant efforts and 
commitments are required on the part of individual governments. They will need 
to enhance fiscal discipline while foregoing independent monetary policy, as an im-
portant macro economic adjustment mechanism. In addition, the desired benefits 
of a common currency – most notably, the easier flow of goods and services across 
national borders – can only be realised if other obstacles to trade, such as deficient 
infrastructure, are tackled at the same time. Whether there is sufficient political 
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will to do so remains unclear: especially the Nigerian leadership has been sending 
mixed messages regarding its commitment to regional integration recently, long 
hesitating to sign up to the AfCFTA, and closing its border to Benin too. Ghana 
remains committed to joining the common currency project as soon as possible, 
but insists on dropping the euro peg. Like its role model, the euro, the eco is thus 
a political project as much as an economic one. The year ahead will show to what 
extent the currency union can unite ECoWAS above and beyond the former French 
colonies.
Legal Winds of Change: Combatting Gender Inequity and  
Discrimination 
Property rights and inheritance rules are contentious political issues, particularly 
so in Africa. We have seen governments dissolve over reforms of family and inherit-
ance laws in the past, including in Côte d’Ivoire. The country is now on the verge of 
passing a new marriage law. The bill, approved by the Council of Ministers in March 
2019 and part of a larger government plan, would provide a legal framework to 
substantially improve gender equity: Both spouses would get equal rights in decid-
ing how to manage marital property, and women’s rights would be secured when it 
comes to inheritance – an aspect still undermined by customary practices in many 
African countries. Parliament still has to pass the bill, which is already being seen 
as a benchmark for other countries of the continent themselves currently discussing 
reforms of marriage and property rights. Zimbabwe is a case in point.
While such reforms address important gender inequities by advancing  women’s 
rights, major gaps in marriage law remain. For example, the new legislation in Côte 
d’Ivoire applies only to formal marriage but not to marriages under customary ar-
rangements or to cohabitation; it does not provide sufficient provisions to tack-
le child marriage; and, it explicitly prohibits same-sex marriage. Laws outlawing 
same-sex relations remain widespread in Africa. They exist in 31 out of the 54 Af-
rican countries (including North Africa), with some still upholding the death pen-
alty in such cases. However, there are also some positive developments; Botswana 
might be leading the way here. In june 2019, the country’s High Court ruled in fa-
vour of decriminalising homosexuality and rejected laws imposing prison sentences 
for same-sex relationships, stating they were unconstitutional. The landmark ruling 
overturned a law which had been in place since 1965, when it was brought in by the 
British colonial government.
Similarly, some countries have started to tackle child marriage – which remains 
common practice in many African countries. Despite provisions within some legal 
frameworks, it is de facto legalised in most (39) countries on the continent. Mo-
zambique, which is among the top-ten countries in terms of the prevalence of child 
marriage, has now started to address the issue head on. The country recently passed 
a law that criminalises the practice, now being punishable with a prison sentence 
of up to 12 years. The law is the latest amendment to a set of reforms in the country 
designed to end discrimination against girls and empower children. 
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